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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Nebraska Views
Mapp v. Ohio - Erving v. State (Nebraska 1962)
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At appellant's trial for first- degree murder the prosecution
attempted to place in.evidence certain bullets which were of the
same type as those used in the slayings. These.bullets had been
obtained by police officers engaged in a search of appellant's home
without a warrant. The trial court allowed the bullets to be re-
ceived in evidence over objection as "incompetent, irrelevant, no
proper foundation laid."'- Appellant was convicted and sentenced to
life imprisonment.2
After the conviction Mapp v. Ohio3 was decided by the United
States Supreme Court. In the Mapp case police officers broke into
the defendant's apartment without a search warrant and discovered
pornographic material on the premises. On the basis of such evi-
dence the defendant was convicted: of violating an Ohio obscenity
statute.4 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding for the
first time that the federal exclusionary rule,5 as a requirement of
the fourth amendment, was applicable to state courts through the
fourteenth amendment.6 Mapp effectively established that evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure was inadmissible in a state
criminal prosecution.
Erving appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court assigning as
error7 the admission in evidence of the illegally obtained bullets
contrary to the rule announced in Mapp. The court, citing footnote
9 in the Mapp majority opinion, ruled that states could apply their
own procedural requirements. 8 As Erving had failed to object to
the admission of the bullets on the specific grounds of illegal search
IErving v. State, 174 Neb.'90, 103, 116 N.W.2d 7, 16 (19'62).
2 Erving v. State, 174 Neb. 90, 116 N.W,2d 7 (1962).
3367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (Page 1954).
5This rule, excluding illegally obtained evidence, was first applied-to the
federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For the
historical development of the rule prior to 'Mapp see, Broeder, Decline
and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REv. 185 (1962).
6367 U.S. at 657.
7Other assignments of error involved discovery, impeachment and ad-
missibility of testimony, vhich are beyond the scope of this note.
8 See note 64 infra and following.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 3
and seizure, under Nebraska's procedural requirements he was
deemed to have waived the same and the conviction was affirmed
II. THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
In holding that Erving waived his constitutional rights under
Mapp, the Nebraska Supreme Court avoided determining whether
that decision should be applied retroactively. Before the Mapp de-
cision and at the time of Erving's trial, the rule concerning illegally
obtained evidence in Nebraska was that the fourth amendment ap-
plied to the states, but that the federal exclusionary rule did not.'0
Retroactive application of the Mapp holding was necessary, there-
fore, to sustain Erving's contention."
A. THE EFFECT OF WARRING V. COLPOYS
With some exceptions, 12 overruling decisions apply retroac-
tively. Retroactivity in criminal law apparently depends upon the
nature of the overruling decision and the manner in which the
9174 Neb. 90, 106, 116 N.W.2d 7, 18 (1962). For further examination of
the Nebraska requirements for raising and preserving issues on appeal
see Pulliam v. State, 167 Neb. 614, 94 N.W.2d 51 (1959); Turpit v. State,
154 Neb. 385, 48 N.W.2d 83 (1951).
1OMapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Wolf had made
the fourth amendment applicable to the states, but at that time the Court
refused to apply the federal exclusionary rule to the states, preferring
that the states find their own solution to the problem. The majority
in Mapp, however, found that the states had been lax in enforcing the
promise of the fourth amendment and overruled Wolf, stating that the
exclusionary rule was a necessary part of the fourth amendment guaran-
tee. For a complete examination of the historical background of the
exclusionary rule, the developments in search and seizure law up to the
time of the Mapp decision, and the problems left unsolved by that
decision, see Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB.
L. REV. 185 (1962); Morris, The End of an Experiment in Federalism-
A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WASH. L. REV. 407, 432 (1961).
"It should be noted that a case such as Erving v. State presents the best
possible situation for retroactive application of Mapp. To reverse Erving
required no greater degree of retroactivity than was actually applied in
remanding the Mapp case for a new trial. That this is a valid analogy
seems to be indicated by the New York decisions. Mapp is considered to
apply prospectively in New York but the decision is applied retroactively
to cases involving the Erving facts. See note 53 infra.
12The main exceptions to the retroactivity rule have come in the vested
property and contract areas. See, e.g., Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1853). For an exhaustive survey of the
exceptions see Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions,
35 ILL. L. REV. 121 (1940).
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issue is presented to the court.13 One area in which retroactivity
is not applied is presented by Warring v. Colpoys.14 Warring was
convicted of violating a federal contempt statute. Subsequent to
his conviction the court re-examined the statute and overruled a
prior construction given to it.15 Although Warring would not have
been convicted under the new construction, the federal court, in-
voking the doctrine of res judicata, refused to apply such con-
struction retroactively. The rationale frequently given for this re-
sult is that when a defendant knowingly violates a present law he
should not be benefited by a subsequent change as his actions
alone precipitated the conviction.1 Obviously this rationale does
not apply to the principal case.
Gaitan v. United States,'7 a recent collateral attack case, ap-
pears, however, to extend the Warring doctrine beyond the above
rationale. Defendant in Gaitan was convicted in federal court on
evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure by state au-
thorities. This evidence was received in reliance on the so-called
"silver platter" doctrine.' s Gaitan asked for relief in federal dis-
trict court under Section 225519 on grounds that the "silver
platter" doctrine had subsequently been destroyed,20 and retro-
activity made the convicting evidence inadmissible. The district
court, in denying relief, stated that the exclusionary rule was a
13 E.g., Eskridge v. Washington Prison-Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Gaitan v.
United States, 295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1961); Runnels v. United States,
138 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1943); Gros v. United States, 136 F.2d 878 (9th
Cir. 1943); Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
14122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
15Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
16"[T] here is little reason to give the benefit of the subsequent construc-
tion of the statute to one who deliberately committed an act even now
punishable by indictment .... I" Comment, Jurisprudence - Shall Over-
ruling Decisions be Giv'en Retrospective Operatiog, 27 IOWA L. REV. 315,
320 (1942).
17295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962); accord,
Pearson v. United States, 305 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1962).
1SThe "silver platter" doctrine permitted state police officers who had
obtained'evidence through illegal search and seizure to turn the evidence
over to federal officers. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), de-
stroyed the doctrine.
1928 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958), provides.- "A prisoner in custody under sentence
of a court established.by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released
upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States .. . may move the court -which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
20Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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court conceived rule of evidence rather than a constitutional re-
quirement and, therefore, was beyond the reach of collateral
attack.21 The court, however, did state that "if the admission of this
evidence was in itself a violation of the Constitution, Sec. 2255
would undoubtedly be applicable.122 Then Mapp decided that the
exclusionary rule did have a constitutional basis which presumably
gave Gaitan grounds for collateral attack. On appeal to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the court, applying the doctrine
of res judicata, affirmed the conviction. Using Warring v. Colpoys
as authority the court stated: "And a change thereafter in the rule
relating to the admissibility of evidence obtained in that manner
did not arrest or suspend application of the principle of res judicata
to such judgments and sentences. '23
Thus, the doctrine of res judicata was extended into an area
outside the rationale of the Warring case, and it is questionable
whether this effect was originally intended by the court deciding
Warring.2-4
B. APPLICATION OF RETROACTIVITY
A leading case involving the retroactive application of a con-
stitutional decision is Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.25 In 1956
the Supreme Court held that the refusal of the state to provide
means for an indigent prisoner to obtain a transcript of his trial
for purposes of appeal was unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment. 26 The Eskridge case applied this decision retroactively
to a prisoner who had been convicted 21 years before his con-
stitutional rights had been ascertained, and held that the state
21United States v. Gaitan, 189 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1960).
221d. at 676. (Emphasis added.)
23295 F.2d 277, 280 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962).
24 See, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Eskridge v. Washington
Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Jordan v. United States, 352 U.S. 904,
reversing 233 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275
(1941); Fransworth v. United States, 232 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Small-
wood v. Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962); United States v. Di
Martini, 118 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
25357 U.S. 214 (1958). Eskridge was convicted of murder in 1935 and im-
mediately applied for a transcript for the purpose of prosecuting an
appeal. He was unable to pay the cost of obtaining the transcript and the
trial judge refused to provide a free one, resulting in his being unable
to appeal. After Griffin, infra note 26, Eskridge asked for habeas corpus
in the Washington Supreme Court, the petition being denied without
opinion. The United States Supreme Court reversed basing the decision
on Griffin v. Illinois.
26 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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must furnish the transcript in order to provide the prisoner his
constitutional safeguards. The case noted that the transcript in
question was still available and could be provided to the prisoner.
The doctrine of retroactivity might therefore have been argued to
be limited by the reasonableness of its results.2 7
in 1962, however, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of
retroactivity to an involuntary confession case despite the state's
specific objection that none of the original evidence was available
for retrial.28 The clear implication of the case is that, in situations
involving constitutional interpretation, the doctrine of retroactivity
must apply to safeguard the individual regardless of the burden
imposed upon the state from such application. This rationale would
require retroactive operation in the Erving situation and would
appear to extend to any case involving illegal search and seizure.
The burden on the state could hardly be more severe in search
and seizure cases than that imposed above.
The vitality of the retroactivity doctrine outside the Warring
v. Colpoys area is indicated by two cases which applied the doctrine
even though no constitutional issue was involved. In Gros v. United
States29 and Runnels v. United States3° defendants were convicted
of murder with the use of confessions elicited while they were
illegally detained.31 Subsequently, in McNabb v. United States,32
the Supreme Court held that a confession obtained during a period
of illegal detention must be excluded. On appeal the court ruled
27People v. Norvell, 25 Ill. 2d 169, 182 N.E.2d 719 (1962), cert. granted, 31
U.S.L. WEEK 3129. Contra, Patterson v. Medberry, 290 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 839 (1962). In People v. Norvell, the court
stenographer died before transcribing the trial record. No one else was
able to transcribe his notes, and because a transcript was unavailable,
defendant was unable to prosecute an appeal from his conviction. The
Illinois court refused to remand the case for a new trial, distinguishing
Eskridge, where a transcript was available.
28 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); accord, United States ex rel. Caminite
v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955).
29 136 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1943).
30 138 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1943).
3 1 FED. R. Caim. P. 5(a) provides: "An officer making an arrest under
a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest
without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary
delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other
nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses
against the laws of .the United States. When a person arrested without
a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a com-
plaint shall be filed forthwith." (Emphasis added.)
32318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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that McNabb applied retroactively and remanded for a new trial
with the confessions excluded. These confessions were not excluded
because they were coerced and thus violated the Constitution, but
simply because they were obtained in violation of Rule 5 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These cases indicate that the
retroactivity doctrine should be applied to changes in the law by
judicial decisions, other than the Warring v. Colpoys situation, and
extended to acts of persons other than the defendant, such as
those in Erving v. State.
C. INDICATIONS FROM MAPP
Unfortunately, Mapp gives very little indication of the intent
of the Court concerning its possible retroactive effect. The only
clue to possible retroactivity seems to be contained in footnote 9
of the majority opinion where Mr. Justice Clark states: 33
We note, moreover, that the class of state convictions possibly
affected by this decision is of relatively narrow compass when com-
pared with Burns v. Ohio, Griffin v. Illinois, and Herman v. Claudy.
In those cases the same contention was urged and later proved
unfounded. [citations omitted.]
It will be observed that Mr. Justice Clark directed his attention
not to future state court action, but to the question of the effect
of the case on previous convictions. In Griffin v. Illinois34 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, strongly urged the
Court to limit the decision to prospective application,35 and Mr.
Justice Clark's use of the phrase "the same contention was urged"
in connection with Griffin seems to refer to the arguments against
retroactive operation. The phrase "of relatively narrow compass",
however, appears to limit retroactive application considerably.
But, as will be shown below, once retroactive operation be admitted,
no valid reason appears for classifying prisoners, permitting one
class the benefit of the rule and denying it to another.36
33 367 U.S. 643, 659 n.9 (1961).
34 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
35 'We must be mindful of the fact that there are undoubtedly convicts
under confinement in Illinois prisons, in numbers unknown to us and
under unappealed sentences imposed years ago, who will find justifica-
tion in this opinion . . .for proceedings . . .upon claims that they are
under illegal detention in that they have been denied a right under the
Federal Constitution. It would be an easy answer that a claim that was
not duly asserted ... cannot be asserted now. ...
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has
always been the law and . . .that those who did not avail themselves
of it waived their rights." Id. at 25 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
36The scope of this paper does not permit the classification of prisoners
into various groups depending upon what they did or did not do.
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Even with limited retroactive operation, those cases in which
defendants objected to admission of the evidence, and particularly
those who took the point to the Supreme Court, should be entitled
to the benefit of the doctrine. In nearly the same position are those
who objected to the evidence at the trial and again on appeal prior
to Mapp and who now wish to attack the convictions collaterally
either through habeas corpus or Section 2255 proceedings. 37
Such previous convictions can be sustained only if the courts
apply Mapp prospectively. One argument which is often advanced
in favor of prospective operation is that there is no question of the
guilt of the prisoner.38 - The evidence is not tainted with unreli-
ability. The persons convicted with such evidence are clearly guilty
and should not be given the opportunity to avoid the sentence
imposed. 9 As stated by one writer: 40
The most telling reason for collateral attack on judgments of con-
viction is that it operates to eliminate the risk of conviction of the
innocent.... The most telling distinction of a defendant convicted
on evidence resulting from an unreasonable search and seizure is
that he is clearly guilty.
The above arguments for prospective operation ignore the effect
of Mapp making the exclusionary rule an essential element of con-
stitutional protection, available to innocent and guilty alike.41
Any solution short of this result [retroactive operation] would put
the court in the position of admitting to two constitutional pro-
visions-one applying to persons convicted on unconstitutionally
seized evidence before the Mapp rule, and another applying to those
convicted after Mapp.
Additionally, unreasonable searches and seizures were ex-
pressly equated with involuntary confessions in Mapp.42 The
Supreme Court has uniformly held that a conviction obtained with
an involuntary confession must be set aside whether or not the
37The requirements for granting relief under either habeas corpus or
Section 2255 are that the prisoner be unconstitutionally imprisoned.
38 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L. J. 319,
341 (1962); Note, 16 RUTGERs L. REV. 587 (1962).
39 Note, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 587 (1962).
4 o Traynor, supra note 38, at 340, 341.
41 Morris, The End of an Experiment in Federalism-A Note on Mapp v.
Ohio, 36 WASH. L. Rzv. 407, 432 (1961).
42 "And nothing could be more certain than that when a coerced confes-
sion is involved, 'the relevant rules of evidence' are overridden without
regard to 'the incidence of such conduct by the police,' slight or frequent.
Why should not the same rule apply to what is tantamount to coerced
testimony by way of unconstitutional seizure of goods, papers, effects,
documents, etc.?" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
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confession was necessary to sustain the conviction,43 and even if
it is probably true.44 The involuntary confession requirement and
the exclusionary rule are both means of assuring that constitutional
promises are safeguarded,4 and should stand on equal footing.
An argument for prospective application might be based on a
theory of state reliance on the prior law of Wolf v. Colorado,46 in
admitting unreasonably seized evidence.4 7 The Court at that time,
however, refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the states,
assuming the states would act to enforce the fourth amendment
in a way most applicable to the particular requirements of each
state. But if the state courts did not so act they "cannot plead
reasonable reliance, let alone hardship, who may have relied on the
now displaced law in violating the Constitution. '48
D. CASES APPLYING MAPP
The argument for retroactive operation of Mapp is further
bolstered by Hall v. Warden.49 Hall did not object to introduction
of illegally obtained evidence during the trial, nor did he raise the
question on appeal. His conviction was affirmed on appeal, and
final judgment was entered. Subsequently, Hall attempted to attack
the conviction collaterally relying on Mapp. The Maryland federal
district court refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus,50 being re-
43 "Consequently, we have rejected the argument that introduction of an
involuntary confession is immaterial where other evidence establishes
guilt or corroborates the confession." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199, 206 (1960). See also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
44 "The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered
from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as
from the actual criminals themselves." Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 320-21 (1959).
45 Ibid.; Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional
Decision; Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650, 660-61 (1962).
46 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
47 Traynor, supra note 38, at 338.
48 Ibid.
49 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2410 (4th Cir. 1963), reversing 201 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md.
1962). See also Hurst v. California, 211 F. Supp. 387, 395 (N.D. Cal.
1962).
50 "1 conclude that Mapp v. Ohio was not intended to require that a new
trial or release must be granted . . . where the point was not raised at
the trial and the judgment had become final before the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Mapp case." 201 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D. Md. 1962).
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luctant to apply Mapp to cases where judgment became final prior
to the date of that decision. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, however, reversed the district court saying: "If the pro-
tections are there now, were they not present when Wolf was de-
cided .... An affirmative answer would appear to be inescapable."''
In addition federal courts in two cases declined to discuss retro-
active effect until the state court had been given an opportunity to
make the determination.52 The state courts are split on the ques-
tion.5 3
If the rule is to be applied prospectively, a defendant's rights
will depend upon the mere fortuity of the time of trial. Defendants
tried prior to Mapp will be deprived of the constitutional rights
granted by that case, but those tried after that decision will be
accorded its full protection. It would seem, therefore, that Mapp
should apply retroactively.
III. THE WAIVER DOCTRINE
A different problem is posed by prisoners who, relying on
Wolf, pleaded guilty, failed to object to illegal evidence when
admitted, or failed to appeal from their convictions. Under the
5131 U.S.L. WEEK 2410 (4th Cir. 1963).
52 United States v. Fay, 199 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. N.Y. 1961); United States
v. New York, 195 F. Supp. 527, 528 (N.D. N.Y. 1961).
53 1 Retroactive operation: Commonwealth v. Spofford, 180 N.E.2d 673
(Mass. 1962); People v. Winterheld, 366 Mich. 428, 115 N.W.2d 80
(1962); State v. Masi, 72 N.J. Super. 55, 177 A.2d 773 (Super. Ct. 1962);
State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962); Stat6 v. Watson, 73
N.J.Super. 477, 180 A.2d 206 (Essex County Ct. 1962); People v. Carafas,
219 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1961); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 233
N.Y.S.2d 462, 179 N.E.2d 478 (1961); People v. McNeil, 11 N.Y.2d 148, 227
N.Y.S.2d 416, 182 N.E.2d 95 (1962); People v. West, 14 App. Div. 2d 601,
218 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1961); People v. Wingate, 34 Misc. 2d 483, 225
N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sullivan County Ct. 1962).
I. Prospective operation: State v. Long, 71 N.J. Super. 583, 177 A.2d
609 (Essex County Ct. 1962) (1960 Conviction); People v. Angelet, 221
N.Y.S.2d 834 (New York County Ct. 1961) (1951 conviction); People v.
Figueroa, 220 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Kings County Ct. 1961) (1957 conviction);
People v. Oree, 220 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Bronx County Ct. 1961) (1954 con-
viction).
54Although there has been no attempt to discuss applicability of the
waiver rule to various classes of prisoners, the possibility exists that
some distinctions might be drawn. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States,
290 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1961). Defendant in that case pleaded guilty after
a motion to suppress evidence was overruled in reliance on the "silver
platter" doctrine. After Elkins v. United States, supra note 18, which
destroyed the "silver platter" doctrine, defendant asked for Section 2255
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 3
waiver doctrine failure to comply with the procedural requirements
for raising and preserving constitutional issues constitutes a waiver
of the right to raise such issues at a later time. The Supreme Court
has held that constitutional issues may be waived by failure to
raise the question at the proper time,55 failure to follow correct
appellate procedure, 56 or failure to state the constitutional issues
specifically. 57 In applying the waiver doctrine, however, the Court
has demanded that the rules for raising and preserving constitu-
tional questions should not be so strict as to constitute a denial
of due process.58 The doctrine should not be applied in a manner to
preclude absolutely a chance to have constitutional questions con-
sidered.59
Appellant in Mapp did not,- either in the brief or in oral argu-
ment, present the question of admissibility of the evidence. 60 In a
brief paragraph near the end of the amicus curiae brief of the
American and Ohio Civil Liberties Union, the Court was urged to
re-examine and overrule Wolf.6' Considering the subordinate role
which that question was given, the Court could justifiably have
applied the waiver doctrine. Since the Court, nevertheless, chose
relief. The court denied relief but said, "If the appellant had submitted
his guilt or innocence to a jury and had been convicted, we would, of
course, guided by Elkins, reverse the conviction." 290 F.2d at 254.
55 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 VhS. 91 (1955), where the requirement that de-
fendant challenge composition of grand jury within three days after
end of term was found not to deprive defendant of due process; Herndon
v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935).
56Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571
(1948); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1948).
57 Bowe v. Scott, 233 U.S. 658 (1914).
58 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) (challenge of composition of grand
jury); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S.
442 (1900).
50 "[T]he right to object to a grand jury presupposes an opportunity to
exercise that right." Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89 (1955). See also
Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442
(1900); People v. Kitchens, 46 Cal. 2d 260, 262, 294 P.2d 17, 19 (1956);
Bender, supra note 45.
00 "Counsel for appellant on oral argument, as in his brief, did not urge
that Wolf be overruled. Indeed, when pressed by questioning from the
bench whether he was not in fact urging us to overrule Wolf counsel
expressly disavowed any such purpose." 367 U.S. 643, 674 n.6 (1961)
(Harlan, J. dissenting).
01 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.3 (1961).
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to consider Wolf, it is arguable that state courts should be extremely
hesitant in applying the waiver doctrine.62
A. AN ARGUMENT FROM FooTNOTE 9
The principal case holding is illustrative of state court holdings
which have envoked the waiver doctrine to cut off possible retro-
active operation of Mapp.63 In a footnote to the majority opinion
in Mapp the Court said: "As is always the case.., state procedural
requirements governing assertion and pursuance of direct and
collateral challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected.!" 4
Using this language, a number of state courts have concluded that
if a defendant fails to object to the admission of illegally obtained
evidence, state procedural requirements can prevent him from
raising the question for the first time on appeal.
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to restrict
retroactive effect through the waiver rule considering the treat-
ment of other areas involving constitutional rights such as the use
of involuntary confessions, 65 the denial of the right to a transcript
on the basis of inability to pay,66 and the denial of the right to
counsel.67 The footnote refers to "challenges to criminal prosecu-
tions" not challenge of a conviction. It appears more likely that
the court was expressing an intent to allow the states to set their
own requirements in future search and seizure situations concerning
the time and method of moving to suppress, and the requirements
for attacking denial of such motions.
This analysis is apparently accepted by the Supreme Court.
Although the Court has never been presented with an opportunity
to rule directly on this question, the majority opinion in Sunal v.
62 "A contrary holding would place an unreasonable burden on defendants
to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless ob-
jections in other situations where defendants might hope that an estab-
lished rule of evidence would be changed on appeal." People v. Kitchens,
46 Cal. 2d 260, 263, 294 P.2d 17, 19 (1956).
63See, e.g., Banks v. Maryland, 228 Md. 130, 179 A.2d 126 (1962); Belton
v. State, 228 Md. 17, 178 A.2d 409 (1962); Erving v. State, 174 Neb. 90,
116 N.W.2d 7 (1962); People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 227 N.Y.S.2d 423,
182 N.E.2d 100 (1962).
0 64367 U.S. 643, 659 n.9 (1961).
65Reek v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); United States ex rel. Caminite v.
Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955).
66 Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Patterson v.
Medberry, 290 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1962).
67Fransworth v. United States, 232 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Smallwood v.
Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962).
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Large6s appears to rule out the use of waiver in the Mapp situation.
The majority in that case clearly indicated that the waiver rule
should not be applied to bar collateral attack relief "where the
law was changed [by the Court] after the time for appeal had
expired." 69 The Mapp-Erving situation is a clear and distinct ex-
ample of this principle.
The application of the above exception to the waiver rule in the
Mapp area is further bolstered by Hall v. Warden.70 Although
defendant in that case failed to raise the illegal search and seizure
objection until he petitioned for habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected applicability of the waiver
rule and granted the writ.71
B. CRITICISMS OF THE WAIVER RUILE
Although the courts have applied the waiver doctrine rather
strictly,72 the recent trend is to make an exception where important
constitutional rights are involved.73 The possible use of waiver to
cut off retroactive application of Mapp has been severely criticized
by one writer: 74
The application of constitutional law cannot under any meaningful
doctrine of waiver be conditioned upon the defendant having raised
arguments which, at the time they should have been raised, had
been fully and expressly rejected by the Supreme Court .... A
broad distinction among prisoners who now claim a constitutional
right on the basis of whether they did or did not acquiesce in Wolf
before Mapp seems untenable.
As applied in Erving v. State, the doctrine forces the defendant
in a criminal case to object on contingencies. He must clair-
voyantly anticipate future changes in the law by judicial decision. 75
68332 U.S. 174 (1947).
69 Id. at 181 (dictum).
70 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2410 (4th Cir. 1963).
71 See discussion at note 49, supra.
72 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (appeal filed one day late).
73 Jordan v. United States, 352 U.S. 904, reversing 233 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir.
1956); United States v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1959).
74 Bender, supra note 45, at 657.
75 "Under the majority decision [Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935)],
however, lawyers will have to burden every record with contingent
constitutional arguments lest they be confronted later with the an-
nouncement that some current decision had laid down a rule which, they
should have anticipated, could have been applied to their case." Fraenkel,
Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1934 Term, 84 U. PA. L. REV.
345, 386 (1936).
CASENOTES
This forces a defendant to make objections in the trial court which
he knows will be overruled.76 Such a result places a heavy burden
on the defense counsel who wishes to present every possible de-
fense for his client. Since there still remain unanswered questions
concerning which, if any, of the rules of federal criminal procedure
will eventually be applied to the states, Erving v. State provides a
host of reasons for objections in every criminal trial.7 7
IV. CONCLUSION*
The court in the principal case should have applied Mapp
retroactively. Mapp placed the exclusionary rule on a constitutional
basis and made the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence an
essential element of due process. Defendant could not take ad-
vantage of that element of due process unless Mapp were to apply
retroactively.
Retroactivity should not be defeated by the waiver rule. This
places on the criminal defendant the burden of anticipating possible
judicial changes which might be of benefit to him. This is true
even where the possibility of change is extremely remote, as evi-
denced by the principal case. Here the defendant was deemed to
have waived a right even though he was not aware of its existence.78
Marvin D. Keller '64
76 Bender, supra note 45, at 657.
77 Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REv. 185
(1962).
78 Cf. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (defendant must knowingly
and intelligently waive the right to counsel, or conviction without rep-
resentation of counsel is in contravention of the sixth amendment and
void).
